• OhVenus_Baby@lemmy.ml
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      10 months ago

      What is unprivate about brave software? Assuming all telemetry is turned off and the browser is configured for strictest of settings no crypto, no ads, no telemetry, no java, session cookie delete, ect ect. Do we have RCP happening phoning home? I have never set brave up behind traffic analysis to see what outbound traffic gets sent that was not from the user. This can be directed towards desktop and mobile.

      Besides the above the only off putting thing I’m aware they have done is installed their VPN software without permission on dekstop which I found myself before I seen the news about it. Edit wording.

    • Lemongrab@lemmy.one
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      10 months ago

      Maybe Cromite (the main bromite fork) would be better. Vivaldi isn’t great, but it also isn’t brave. It allows for blocklist importing and user scripts, and is on desktop Windows as well.

  • WhatAmLemmy@lemmy.world
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    10 months ago

    You don’t want a randomised fingerprint, as that is relatively unique among a sea of fingerprints [1]. What you want is a fingerprint that’s as similar to everyone else (generic) as possible; that’s what Firefox’s resist fingerprinting setting aims to do, and what the Tor browser does.

    [1] There are many values you can’t change, so the randomisation of the ones you can change could end up making you more unique … think of it like having your language set to french but are based in the USA — that language setting can’t uniquely identify the French in france, but will stick out like a sore thumb if set in shitsville Idaho. It’s likely the same if you use firefox but have your user agent set to chrome; that’s more rare and unique than not changing the user agent at all.

    • Rez@sh.itjust.works
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      10 months ago

      But isn’t randomization supposed to give you a different unique fingerprint each time? So yes, you would be unique and easily tracked but only until your fingerprint changes

        • WhatAmLemmy@lemmy.world
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          10 months ago

          Where do the EFF recommend randomisation? From the EFF’s surveillance self defence course.

          This can be an effective method for breaking persistence, but it is important to note that a tracker may be able to determine that a randomization tool is being used, which can itself be a fingerprinting characteristic. Careful thought has to go into how randomizing fingerprinting characteristics will or will not be effective in combating trackers.

          They don’t directly recommend either… But then on https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn

          In practice, the most realistic protection currently available is the Tor Browser, which has put a lot of effort into reducing browser fingerprintability. For day-to-day use, the best options are to run tools like Privacy Badger or Disconnect that will block some (but unfortunately not all) of the domains that try to perform fingerprinting, and/or to use a tool like NoScript( for Firefox), which greatly reduces the amount of data available to fingerprinters.

          So the EFF seem to recommend generic over randomisation…

          Maybe ask yourself why the Tor project decided against randomisation?

    • linearchaos@lemmy.world
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      10 months ago

      No, that’s absolutely incorrect. You want a new fake fingerprint every single time someone asks your browser for your information. You want it to lie about your plugins, user agent, your fonts and your screen size. Bonus if you use common values, but not necessary.

      The randomized data they’re providing isn’t static and it isn’t the same from session to session.

      100% White noise is a far better obfuscation than a 40% non-unique tracking ID. Yes, your data is lumped in with 47 million other users, but used in conjunction with static pieces of your data you become uncomfortably identifiable.

        • WhatAmLemmy@lemmy.world
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          10 months ago

          Yeah… I don’t know why a bunch of privacy bros think they know better than the CS and cryptography PhD’s of the Tor project; the most advanced and complex privacy and anonymity preserving project in computing history.

  • halfempty@kbin.social
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    10 months ago

    I believe that Firefox has a mechanism where millions of users all have the same fingerprint, which makes the whole concept of browser fingerprinting useless.

  • virtualbriefcase@lemm.ee
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    10 months ago

    Yes. Brave focuses on providing random data points each time it’s asked (e.g. screen size). A hardened Firefox will try to provide a generic fingerprint.

    Apples to oranges more or less, I’m unaware of any proof that one or the other is considerably better across the board. Though my gut does tell me that randomization is a lot better in the specific situation of regularly signing in and out of accounts.

  • privacybro@lemmy.ninja
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    10 months ago

    mullvad browser which is a TOR browser fork, seems to defeat fingerprint.com per-session.

    brave strict fingerprint protection on its own actually does not even do this afaik